Nation building, the simultaneous allocation of economic aid and military assistance in conict and post-conict environments, has cost the world trillions of dollars over the last half century. Yet few attempts have been made to quantify the potential economic growth eects for the recipient country from the provision of this aid. While foreign aid potentially crowds out private investment during normal times, economic and military aid together may foster security and thereby encourage private investment during times of conict. Using a forty-ve year panel dataset, we construct a measure of nation building with a three-way interaction term between military assistance, economic aid, and conict regime. Considering that slow growing countries may be less likely to receive aid, we instrument for economic aid by estimating donor-to-donee aid ows using United Nations voting and colonial legacy histories. We nd that spending on nation building does have a positive eect on economic growth. Once conict ceases, however, we nd that continued military operations coupled with economic aid harms growth. The results hold whether a single country or a multilateral group performs the nation building operation.
